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I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose a website promotes a book and a series of audio-taped lectures
entitled The System for Better Sight. The system supposedly teaches individuals
how to improve their vision by at least 50% through the completion of twenty
eye exercise sessions over the span of a two-month period. The website promises that by following the "system" and "techniques" in the book and on the
tapes, individuals can see "better without glasses, contacts, or the risks of surgery." The advertisement attributes the ideas and techniques of the system to a
Dr. Simon Hazel, who heads the Institute for Better Acuity without Lenses or
Lasik ("I-BALL"). The advertisement references "case studies" from Dr. Hazel's book, such as a 53 year-old Walter 0. from Omaha who "wore Coke-bottle
glasses 14 to 15 hours every single day, but now he's glasses-free"; a 30 year-
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old Sam M. from Boston who "went from six diopters to clear vision without
glasses after using the system for a month"; and an Adrian B. from Philadelphia
who "went from 20:200 vision to 20:20 in only two months." The net impression one derives from these specific claims and the testimonials is that purchasing and following The System for Better Sight, available for $29.95, will substantially improve vision in a short period of time and obviate the need for
glasses or surgery to correct vision. The only problem is that the system does
not work.
The claims in this hypothetical advertisement are precisely the type that
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") would seek to enjoin. The FTC enforces federal consumer protection laws that prohibit fraud, deception, and unfair business practices. For example, under the Federal Trade Commission Act,1
the FTC has broad authority to prohibit "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
or affecting commerce.",2 Sections 52-55 of the FTC Act 3 prohibit the dissemination of false advertisements for food, drugs, devices, services or cosmetics.4
An advertisement is false if it is "misleading in a material respect."5 According
to the FTC's Policy Statement on Deception, a material misrepresentation "involves information that is important to consumers and, hence, likely to mislead
them and, hence, likely to affect their choice of, or conduct regarding, a product."' 6 Here, the claims of vastly improved vision through eye exercises are
likely false and, therefore, likely to violate the FTC Act.
These advertising claims are misleading, even if they are capable of being true, if Dr. Hazel lacks sufficient scientific evidence to justify those claims.
According to the FTC's Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation,7 advertisers and ad agencies must have a "reasonable basis" for "objective"
claims contained in advertisements before disseminating those claims. 8 The
rationale of this policy is that "[o]bjective claims for products or services represent explicitly or by implication that the advertiser has a reasonable basis supporting these claims" and that "consumers would be less likely to rely on claims
for products and services if they knew the advertiser did not have a reasonable
basis for believing them to be true." 9 If the advertiser claims a certain level of
substantiation in the ad (e.g., "studies show" or "doctors recommend"), the FTC

1

15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006).

2

Id. § 45(a)(2).

3

Id. §§ 52-55.

4

Id. § 52(a)(1).

5

Id.
In re Cliffdale Assoc., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 165 (app.) (1984).
See In re Thompson Med. Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 648, 839 (app.) (1984), affid, 791 F.2d 189

6

7

(D.C. Cir. 1986).
8
Id. at 839.
9

Id.
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expects the advertiser to possess at least that same level of substantiation.10
When no such claims are made, the determination of whether the advertiser has
a "reasonable basis" depends, in part, on what amount of substantiation experts
in the field believe is adequate; other relevant considerations include the type of
claim, the product at issue, the consequences of a false claim, the benefits of a
truthful claim, and the cost of developing substantiation for the claim."
For health claims in advertising, the substantiation must consist of
"competent and reliable scientific evidence," defined as "tests, analyses, research, studies or other evidence based upon the expertise of professionals in the
relevant area, that has been conducted and evaluated in an objective manner by
persons qualified to do so, using procedures generally accepted in the profession
to yield accurate and reliable results."' 2 It is doubtful that the hypothetical Dr.
Hazel of I-BALL has this level of substantiation for the health claim that individuals can dramatically improve eyesight (e.g., from 20:200 to 20:20) in two
months, without corrective lenses or surgery. Thus, the advertisement will
likely run afoul of the FTC Act because its efficacy claims are unsubstantiated.
Yet, a concern remains. The System for Better Sight is not, at bottom,
an ad for a dietary supplement that purportedly delivers an exaggerated health
benefit. The system (a book and a few audio tapes) is comprised entirely of
speech that conveys ideas about human vision and techniques that allegedly
improve vision. An FTC enforcement action, therefore, ostensibly would seek
to preclude the advertisement of a product comprised of "an exposition of
ideas,"' 13 a product which arguably lies at the core of the First Amendment right
to free speech.
In general, unless a book expresses a defamatory idea or discloses confidential or private information, such as trade secrets, its ideas cannot be suppressed, even if they are patently false and cause consumer injury.' 4 Of course,
in The System for Better Sight hypothetical, the FTC would not necessarily be
seeking to suppress the book itself, but rather only the advertising for the book.
It is unsettled, however, whether there is a constitutionally significant distinction between the book's content and the advertisement's content. The right to
free speech might be empty if a person lacks the right to promote his or her
ideas widely, such as through advertising.

10

Id.

11

Id. at 840.

12

See, e.g., In re Hi-Health Supermart Corp., FTC File No. 032-3239=(Feb. 15, 2005) (agree-

ment containing consent order regarding advertisements for dietary supplement that purportedly
treats various eye disorders), available at http://www.ftc.gov/oslcaselist/0323239/050517
do0323239.pdf.
13
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
14
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (noting that "erroneous statement
of fact is ... inevitable in free debate" and is constitutionally protected unless the law of defamation holds otherwise); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) (same).
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Although the Supreme Court had yet to announce its "commercial
speech" doctrine, in 1971,15 the FTC adopted an enforcement policy termed the
"Mirror Image" Doctrine to avoid the potential constitutional obstacles to regulating advertisements for products that contain content that is fully protected by
the First Amendment. According to that enforcement policy:
The Commission, as a matter of policy, ordinarily will not proceed against advertising claims which promote the sale of books
and other publications: Provided,The advertising only purports
to express the opinion of the author or to quote the contents of
the publication; the advertising discloses the source of statements quoted or derived from the contents of the publication;
and the advertising discloses the author to be the source of opinions expressed about the publication. Whether the advice being
offered by the publication will achieve, in fact, the results
claimed for it in the advertising will not be controlling if appropriate disclosures have been made. This policy does not apply,
however, if the publication, or its advertising, is used to promote the sale of some other product as part of a commercial
scheme.16
As noted, the Mirror Image Doctrine does not immunize books or other
publications used to promote another product as part of a commercial scheme,
such as a dietary supplement. For example, in FTC v. Braswell, the Commission alleged that purchasers of the defendants' dietary supplements had received
a subscription to a magazine entitled The Journalof Longevity, which appeared
to be a legitimate medical journal with scientific articles written by medical
professionals but which actually amounted to advertisements for defendants'
lung disease, diabetes, Alzheimer's, weight loss, and impotence products. 17 The
fact that the magazines were really glorified advertisements for defendants'
products not only brought them outside the protections of the Mirror Image
Doctrine, but it also deflated any argument that the FTC was attempting to regulate the marketplace of ideas, as opposed to the marketplace of dietary supplements.
Unlike the Braswell case, The System for Better Sight hypothetical
would appear to comfortably fit within the Mirror Image Doctrine. First, the
website promotes the sale of a book, as well as audio tapes, which contain a
spoken version of the book's content. Second, the website purports to express
the opinion of a Dr. Simon Hazel, the president of I-BALL, and refers to the
15

16

See infra Section III.A.
Advertising in Books, Enforcement Policy, 36 Fed. Reg. 13,414 (July 21, 1971).

17
See Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 5, FrC v. Braswell,
No. CV 03-3700-DT (PJWx) (C.D. Cal. May 27, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.
gov/os/2003/05/gerovitacmp.pdf.
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content of his book. Third, the website discloses the source of the advertising
claims to be Dr. Hazel's book. Thus, the fact that Dr. Hazel has not substantiated the efficacy of his improved vision claims would be irrelevant. The FTC
would not take regulatory action if it adhered to the Mirror Image Doctrine.
In The System for Better Sight example, the health or safety risks are not
necessarily great because, at worst, consumers would learn useless eye exercises
in exchange for becoming $29.95 poorer (unless Dr. Hazel offers a money-back
guarantee).18 The FTC may exercise its discretion not to prosecute. It is not
difficult to imagine, however, more serious advertising campaigns that qualify
for Mirror Image immunity-for example, The System to Cure Heart Disease or
The System to Cure Cancer. In such cases, consumers might delay or forego
legitimate treatment options for their serious illnesses, and thereby jeopardize
their health, in addition to their pocketbooks. Accordingly, the Mirror Image
Doctrine represents a significant regulatory loophole that may expose consumers to considerable risk.
This article analyzes the constitutional need for the Mirror Image Doctrine in light of current First Amendment jurisprudence. After discussing the
limited number of cases that address the FTC's ability to regulate books and
book-like products, the article provides an overview of the evolution of the
FTC's enforcement approach: from prohibiting the advertising of unsubstantiated health claims derived from fully protected books, to the subsequent adoption of the Mirror Image Doctrine, which permits the advertisement of unsubstantiated claims contained in a book as long as the advertiser makes certain
minimal disclosures.
This article then explores several legal theories that, if adopted, would
permit the FTC to regulate deceptive advertising for books that promise certain
types of health or financial benefits, without violating the First Amendment.
Under one view, the First Amendment protects such book advertising no more
than the advertising for any other type of product, such as a dietary supplement.' 9 As such, misleading advertising for these books constitutes misleading
commercial speech, which is not constitutionally protected. 20 Although the Supreme Court has held that commercial speech is entitled to full First Amendment protection when it is inextricably intertwined with fully protected speech,
the Court developed that rule in the context of in-person, charitable or religious
solicitation, which are core First Amendment activities; 2' in those contexts, the
speaker's motivation is often to convey ideas and convince the listener and to
obtain funds for further charitable or religious activities. By contrast, advertising for books promising disease cures or weight loss often is not intended to
18

Under FTC precedent, money-back guarantees do not cure otherwise deceptive claims be-

cause they do not compensate the consumer for the time and expense of returning the item. See In
re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 95 F.T.C. 406, 518 (1980), afftd, 676 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1982).
19
See infra Section III.A.
20
See id.
21
See id.
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convince or persuade in and of itself, but rather is often intended to entice consumers to engage in a commercial transaction (i.e., a purchase) that will lead to
certain objectively verifiable benefits, such as better vision, weight loss or an
increase in personal wealth. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's professed reluctance to parse commercial from non-commercial messages does not necessarily
apply to efficacy claims that are excerpted from a book and contained in an offer to sell that book.2 2
Second, the FTC's authority to regulate book advertising could be
viewed as being similar to the power of the state to regulate commercial transactions. 23 The FTC's regulatory authority does not target the ideas in the book,
but rather targets the objectively verifiable benefit that the advertisement promises to consumers who purchase and use the book. These promises form part of
the basis of the bargain between the consumer and the advertiser. FTC regulation would simply provide a means of regulating the offer and acceptance process, which contract law currently regulates without raising any First Amendment
concerns.
1I. THE MIRROR IMAGE DOCTRINE: THE FTC's ATTEMPT TO ASSUAGE FIRST
AMENDMENT CONCERNS

The few published court cases that address the FTC's constitutional authority to regulate advertising for books are quite ancient. For example, in
1941, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in Scientific
Manufacturing Co. v. FTC,24 that the FTC could not enjoin a pharmacist and
chemist from selling pamphlets that professed the dangers of poisoning from
using aluminum utensils in the preparation and storage of food. Although the
FTC had found the opinions in the pamphlet to be false and misleading, the
court held that the author "dealt in opinions and no more" and that the FTC
could not "foreclose expression of honest opinion in the course of one's business of voicing opinion. ,,25 The case, however, did not involve the issue of
whether it would have been constitutional for the FTC to regulate the advertising of that pamphlet for the purpose of inducing sales of the pamphlet. ApVarently, the author did not advertise the pamphlet at all; he only distributed it. In
addition, the court pointed out that the pamphlet's author was not involved with
the manufacture, sale, or distribution of the alternative cooking utensils that his
book advocated.27 The implication was that if the pamphlets had merely been

22

See id.

23

See infra Section III.B.

24

124 F.2d 640, 644 (3d Cir. 1941).
id. at 644.
Id. at 641 n.3.
Id. at 641.

25
26
27
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glorified advertisements for another product (like cooking utensils), the First
Amendment would not have posed a barrier to an FTC enforcement action.
Twelve years later, the Sixth Circuit applied similar reasoning in Koch
v. FTC,28 where it held that advertisements in a medical journal for preparations
to treat cancer, leprosy, malaria, coronary disease, epilepsy, psoriasis, syphilis,
arthritis, and insanity were subject to the F'C's regulation; by contrast, the FTC
could not enjoin the dissemination of claims made in a book that explained the
alleged theories behind the medical preparations, because the book set forth
"primarily matter of opinion." Like Scientific Manufacturing,29 however, the
Koch case did not involve the FTC's attempt to regulate the advertising for a
product that is fully protected by the First Amendment.
The FTC itself addressed the issue directly in 1960, in the matter of In
re Witkower Press,30 which was an administrative enforcement proceeding
against the author and publisher of a book entitled Arthritis and Common Sense.
The book advocated a dietary regimen for the treatment and cure of arthritis and
rheumatism. 31 Television, radio, and print advertisement for the book represented the author to be a doctor, which in fact he was not.32 The author's Ph.D.
had been bestowed by a university that the author had never visited, and his only
knowledge of the university's existence was based upon his having seen the
name emblazoned on his diploma. 33 The author also was not trained as a scientist as claimed, and it was clear that his opinions about arthritis and rheumatism
were unsubstantiated.34
During the administrative hearing, the author made no serious attempt
to substantiate the theories he advocated in his book, although he did introduce
evidence of certain "tests," such as "those based upon the effect of water taken
with meals," "chicken soup tests," "tests to demonstrate that 'water and oil don't
mix,'.... ear wax tests," "ridged fingernail tests," and "butter tests. 35 The author
also allegedly "verified" his theories "by introducing an arthritic condition and
then effecting the cure through his corrective diet regime. 36 The hearing examiner adjudicating the action had little difficulty concluding that the regimens in
the book
were not an effective means of treating or curing arthritis or rheuma37
tism.

28

206 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1953).

29

124 F.2d 640.

30

57 F.T.C. 145 (1960).

31

32

Id. at 148.
Id. at 150.

33

Id. at 153.

34
35

Id. at 154.

36

37

Id. at 196.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 221.
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Perhaps recognizing the futility of proffering competent and reliable
scientific evidence, the author focused his efforts on a First Amendment defense
to the FTC's prosecution.38 Before the hearing examiner, he argued that, to the
extent any advertisement of any sort merely repeats the substantive matter in the
book, and does nothing more, those advertisements were protected by the First
Amendment. 39 The hearing examiner rejected this argument rather viscerally,
declaring that the "speciosity and superficiality of such reasoning is patent and
untenable" and that the author's argument was "patently without the veil of reason and contrary to logic and common sense."'' Of course, a decade later, the
Commission would come to adopt this "specious," "superficial,. "untenable,"
unreasonable, and illogical argument as official policy in the form of the Mirror
Image Doctrine.4 '
The hearing examiner justified an order prohibiting the author from circulating false or misleading advertisements concerning the regimens set forth in
the book by drawing a "vital differentiation between the book itself and advertising matter pertaining to the book,, 42 the latter of which the FTC could regulate without running afoul of the First Amendment. Were it otherwise, reasoned
the hearing examiner,
one could simply write or compose a book containing many untenable, even absurd, theories and then, by means of advertising
in the public press, and by radio and television, represent that
all such things were in fact true and, according to the theory of
the respondents, they would occupy an impregnable position in
so asserting under the aegis of the constitutional right, an obvious non sequitur.43
The Commission affirmed the findings of the hearing examiner and
found no First Amendment issue in prohibiting unsubstantiated claims in advertisements about the book."4 Like the hearing examiner, the Commission distinguished between making the misrepresentations set forth in the book itself and

38

Id. at 197.

39

Id.
Id. at 151. The Hearing Examiner also rejected the argument that book jackets were protected by the First Amendment on the ground that they were an integral part of the book. Id. at
154-55. The Examiner held that it is the custom of book publishers to dress up their books in
attractive and colorful jackets and to include representations by the author and reviewers to get
people to buy the book. The purpose was to increase sales of the book and therefore was advertising matter. Id.
41
See supra notes 16-17.
42
In re Witkower, 57 F.T.C at 205.
40

43

Id.

Id.
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repeating those misrepresentations in advertising.4 5 Although the Commission
agreed that books, like motions pictures and publications, are "expressions of
opinion" that the First Amendment protects, even if sold for a profit, the Commission held that "[s]uch selling, however, 'brings into the transaction a commercial feature"' 6 which Conress can regulate, specifically, the "commercial
evils" of deceptive advertising.
The FTC followed In re Witkower Press seven years later in In re Rodale Press, Inc.48 There, the respondents to the FTC enforcement action had
falsely advertised that following the regimens specified in a book and pamphlet
would prevent, cure, or treat various diseases. 49 The Commission rejected the
respondents' First Amendment argument. 50 The Commission acknowledged
that "the ability to advertise is as important to the exercise of the right of free
speech as it is to the correlative right of freedom of the press.",5' The Commission reasoned, however, that there was no possibility that "regulating the advertising could operate in any way as an impediment to the circulation and distribution of the publications themselves. 5 2 Moreover, the FTC found that "nothing
in the Constitution or in the decisions interpreting its protection suggests that an
advertisement of a book or other publication is to be regarded per se an extension of53 the writing and hence as within the protection of the First Amendment.
The Commission distinguished respondents' advertising from the advertisement to which the Supreme Court afforded full First Amendment protection
4 Sullivan involved a libel action brought by an
in New York Times v. Sullivan.M
official of Montgomery, Alabama, against four black clergyman and the New
York Times for printing a full-page newspaper advertisement that stated that
various police and government officials in the South were imposing a "wave of
terror" on black, non-violent demonstrators, in violation of their constitutional
rights.55 The text concluded with a monetary appeal for various civil rights
causes.56 The Court held that the clergymen's "editorial advertisement... was
not a 'commercial' advertisement" because "[it communicated information,
expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought
45
46
48
49
50
51

Id. at 221.
Id. at 219-20 (quoting Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951)).
Id. at 220.
71 F.T.C. 1184, 1219 (1967).
Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1232.
Id. at 1234.

52

Id.

53

Id.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 256 (quoting advertisement attached in the appendix at 740-41).

47

54

55
56

IA
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financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are
matters of the highest public interest and concern., 57 The allegedly libelous
statements did not forfeit their constitutional protection
just "because they were
58
published in the form of a paid advertisement.
For the Commission in Rodale Press,59 the respondents' advertising was
not designed as a vehicle for the expression of any of their personal views or
opinions on health or any other subject, nor were the ads structured to disclose
"any of respondents' discoveries, theories or suggestions respecting health problems for their own sake."' 6 Rather, "the entire format and advertising message
[was] focused on urging the public to purchase respondents' book and pamphlet
in order to find out for themselves the author's answers to the health problems
which the advertising [told] the reader [were] discussed in these publications.'
Moreover, the FTC's complaint was constitutionally proper because it did not
challenge the truth or falsity of any statements made in either of the advertised
publications, but alleged false advertising based exclusively on representations
contained in the advertising. The very language of this advertising had falsely
made "an affirmative promise of therapeutic benefits," a "guarantee" that following the regimens outlined in the book would provide a variety of health
benefits.62
Ultimately, the Commission did not need to opine on the First Amendment issues in the case because a majority of the Commission decided to resolve
the case on another ground entirely. A majority found that the respondents' advertising actually overstated the content of the publications.63 According to the
majority, whereas the ads promised certain therapeutic benefits, the publications
themselves made no such "flamboyant" and "exaggerated" claims and, in fact,
contained careful disclosures regarding the limitations of the regimens. 64 Thus,
according to the majority, the FTC's enforcement action was premised on the
fact that the advertising misrepresented the content of respondents' publications.
Under the majority's characterization of the facts, the FTC's action had nothing
to do with a governmental attempt to restrict the dissemination of false ideas
contained in a fully protected publication, but with the fact that respondents had
misrepresented the ideas contained in their fully protected books in order to
make a profit. The relevant misrepresentation, according to the majority, was
57

Id. at 266.

58

Id.

59
60

71 F.T.C. 1184 (1967).

61

Id. at

62

63

Id. at 1235.
1235-36.
Id. at 1238.
Id. at 1239-40 ("In sharp contrast to the flamboyant claims in respondents' advertising of the

therapeutic benefits which readers will gain from reading the book and pamphlet, the publications
themselves make no such claims.") (footnote omitted).
64
Id. at 1253 (Elman, J., dissenting).
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the failure of the advertisement to mirror the content of the publications. 65 The
merit of the health claims themselves was no longer material to the case.
Commissioner Elman dissented on the ground that the majority had inappropriately taken the case out of the Witkower mold by disingenuously reframing the case as one in which the claims in the advertising and in the publications did not jibe.66 Commissioner Elman noted that the FTC's complaint
attacked the advertising claims as unsubstantiated, just as in Witkower, not as
being misrepresentations of the actual content of the publications.6 7 His dissent
further opined that it is constitutional for the FTC to regulate misrepresentations
concerning the subject matter of the book (which was not really the case as the
majority concluded), but not ads that repeat false claims contained in the book.68
Telegraphing the Commission's adoption of the Mirror Image Doctrine four
years later, Commissioner Elman reasoned that ads are constitutionally protected as long as they truthfully describe the book's content because the constitutional right to write and disseminate a book includes the right to advertise it.
As noted above, the Mirror Image Doctrine provides that the FTC ordinarily will not proceed against advertising claims that promote the sale of books
or other publications, even if the advertising repeats unsubstantiated or false
claims contained in the book. 69 To avoid an enforcement action, the advertiser
need only make sure that the ad (1) expresses the opinion of the author or quotes
the contents of the publication; (2) discloses the source of statements quoted or
derived from the contents of the publication; and (3) discloses the author to be
the source of opinions expressed about the publication. 70 There are no published, adjudicated decisions from the FTC or the federal courts addressing the
application of the Mirror Image Doctrine. There are only a handful of administrative consent orders, which lack precedential value. Nevertheless, these orders
do provide insight into the FTC's enforcement approach to advertisements for
books.
Since the FTC's formal adoption of the Mirror Image Doctrine in
197 1,71 it appears that, when confronted with false or deceptive advertising for
books, the agency has strived to fit the case into the enforcement model that
65

Id. at 1239-40.

66

Id. at 1252.

67

On Rodale Press's petition for review, the D.C. Circuit held that the Commission had not

afforded Rodale Press reasonable notice of the change in legal theories and vacated the cease and
desist order. Rodale Press, Inc. v. FTC, 407 F.2d 1252, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("The theory under
which the [FTC administrative] complaint was issued and under which the hearing before the
examiner was held differed from the theory upon which the complaint was ultimately sustained by
the Commission."). On remand from the court, the Commission dismissed the complaint. In re
Rodale Press, Inc., 74 F.T.C. 1429 (1968).
68

Rodale Press, 407 F.2d at 1252-53 (Elman, J., dissenting).

69
70

See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
See id.
See id.

71
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dissenting Commissioner Elman advocated in Rodale Press-primarilytargeting advertising claims that misrepresent the content of the book. In 1991, the
FTC entered a consent order in In re Wayne Phillips.72 The FTC's complaint
challenged the advertising of a book entitled How to Start Your Own Business
By Doing Business With The Government.73 Several counts of the complaint
challenged false factual statements made in the ad, but which did not relate to
the book itself.74 Count I challenged the claim that there are 33 billion dollars in
grants available from the government to start small businesses. 75 Count II challenged the claim that it is easy for the average consumer to obtain a government
grant to start virtually any type of small business.76 By contrast, the counts that
refer to the book challenged only those claims that misrepresented the content of
the book.7 7 For example, Count III challenged the claim that the book consists
primarily of information on how average consumers can easily obtain grants
from the government
to start virtually any kind of small business, which, in
78
truth, it did not.
Counts I and II posed no First Amendment issue because they did not in
any way challenge the content of the book, but only the false advertising claims
made in the context of selling the book. 79 And, although Count III required reference to the book's content, the examination of content was for the sole purpose of determining whether the particular content actually appeared in the
book, as the ad claimed.80 Count III posed no constitutional concerns, in the
same way that there would be no valid First Amendment defense to an advertisement promising that a book contains the complete works of Shakespeare,
when it really contains the rap lyrics of 50 Cent.8
The 1994 consent order in In re Del Dotto Enters., Inc. 82 involved a set
of books and audio cassette tapes known as the Cash Flow System. The books
were promoted through infomercials and at public seminars, and the advertisements made unsubstantiated claims that the books and tapes would teach con72

114 F.T.C. 587 (1991).

73

Id. at 588.
Id. at 588-95.

74
75
76
77

Id. at 588-89.
Id. at 589-90.
Id. at 590-92.

78

Id.
Id. at 588-90.
80
Id. at 590-92.
81
It is reasonably clear that the Mirror Image Doctrine was operating in the background of
Count III. The consent order, however, did not incorporate the full Mirror Image proviso, but
rather merely provided that whenever the respondents represent that any book or writing contains
information about a particular subject or topic, they shall not be required to possess and rely on
evidence that the information in the book or other writing is true. Id. at 609-10.
82
117 F.T.C. 446 (1994).
79
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sumers how to obtain a $100,000 line of credit and loans at very low interest
rates.83 As in Wayne Phillips, the FTC's complaint focused on advertising
claims that did not mirror the actual content of the books. 84 The complaint challenged the claims that the advertisement for a book entitled Treasury of Government Loans does not show customers how to pocket some portion of the proceeds of a $17,500 government home improvement loan. 5 The complaint also
challenged an advertisement for a book entitled Your Credit, The Key to Financial Resources, which falsely claimed how consumers can get over $100,000 of
unsecured credit through credit cards. 86 According
to the complaint, the books
87
did not contain any discussion of these topics.
Unlike the approach in Wayne Phillips,several of the complaint allegations appeared to challenge more than the lack of book content corresponding to
the content promised in the advertisement; the complaint also targeted the truth
of the book content itself. For instance, the complaint alleged that the advertising claim that the book entitled Treasury of Government Loans does not teach
customers how every homeowner can immediately get a government home improvement loan for $17,500 was false not because the book failed to address the
topic, but rather because consumers needed to meet eligibility requirements under the pertinent loan program. 8 The complaint also alleged that the advertising
claim that the same book showed customers how they could get loans for 1-3%
of all available money, under circumstances normally and expectably encountered by consumers, was false not because the book failed to address the topic,
but because the 1-3% loans were either available in very limited circumstances
or were no longer available. 89
The same year as Del Dotto, the consent order in In re Wyatt Marketing
Corp. enjoined the distribution of an infomercial that made false claims about
the content of a book entitled 101 Ways to Get Cash from the Government
(hereafter the Government Benefits Book).9 1 Like prior consent orders, the
complaint challenged false advertising claims that did not directly relate to the
content of the book at issue.92 Also like prior consent orders, the complaint
challenged advertising claims that the book contained certain content, when it in
83

Id. at 449-50.

84
85

Id. at 446-53.
Id. at 450.

86

Id.

87
88

Id. at 450-51.
Id. at 450.

89

Id. at 451.

The Del Dotto consent order contains no Mirror Image proviso and broadly

prohibits the respondents from misrepresenting the "availability, terms or conditions of any loan,
grant or credit from any source for any purpose." Id. at 463.
90
118 F.T.C. 86, 87 (1994).
91
92

Id. at 112-13.
Id. at 87-88.
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fact did not.93 But, as in Del Dotto, at least one of the counts of the complaint
involved a more in depth challenge to the content of the book. Specifically, the
complaint challenged the advertising claim that consumers who use the Government Benefits Book would realize an average of $87,500 in government
grants and loans. 94 This particular claim apparently was not made in the book,
yet challenging this claim required the FTC to challenge the content of the book
itself. To determine the falsity of the claim, the FTC likely had to analyze all of
the grant and loan ideas outlined in the book and determine that the $87,500
figure from the ad was unsupported. The claim was false because the information provided in the book was useless, unsubstantiated,
or at least insufficient to
95
achieve an average success rate of $87,500.
Two years later, the FTC entered the consent order in In re WLAR Co.,96
which involved advertising that promoted a booklet to teenage girls purportedly
containing a regimen to control appetite and lose substantial amounts of weight
without exercise or dieting. The FTC challenged some of the advertising claims
because they misstated the content of the booklet-for example, by claiming
that purchasers were not required to diet to lose weight, when in fact the booklets required diet and exercise. 97 But the FTC also took issue with other advertising claims arising out of the content of the booklet itself. For example, the
complaint alleged that the claim that the booklet caused purchasers to control
appetite, lose weight, and reduce body fat was unsubstantiated and therefore
false.98 The content of the booklet, however, ostensibly taught techniques to
lose weight. So, the advertising claim was false only if the techniques in the
booklet did not actually lead to weight loss. The only way for the FTC to have
made this determination was by examining the truth of the speech in the booklet.
The same issues attached to the consent order in In re Johnson &
Collins Research, Inc.,99 which involved the advertising of booklets called Total
Body Reshaping System and Super Total Body Reshaping System. The booklets
claimed that consumers would have a thinner body and less fat after two weeks,
93

Id. at 88-89, 91-92.

94

Id. at 94.
95
Unlike the Del Dotto order, the Wyatt Marketing order included an abbreviated mirror image proviso like in Wayne Phillips, stating that "whenever respondent represents that any book or
other writing contains information about a particular subject or topic," the company is not required to substantiate the information set forth in the book, but only that the information is present
in the book. Id. at 113. Commissioner Starek filed a concurring statement, noting that the proviso
did not include all of the Mirror Image Doctrine's provisions, particularly, those involving the
required attribution of the claims to the author and the exemption for books that promote other
products. Id. at 115-16.
96
121 F.T.C. 98 (1996).
97
98

Id. at 104-05.
Id. at 105.

99

121 F.T.C. 675 (1996).
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without dieting or exercise. As in WLAR, the ads were deceptive not only because the booklets actually required dieting, but also because the weight and fat
loss claims were unsubstantiated."°° Again, to determine whether the weight
and fat loss claims in the advertising were unsubstantiated, the FTC necessarily
had to examine the content of the booklets and conclude that the assertions
therein were unsubstantiated.
Perhaps the allegedly false and unsubstantiated claims in Del Dotto,
Wyatt Marketing, WLAR, and Johnson & Collins would have avoided FIC scrutiny had the ad copy strictly complied with the Mirror Image Doctrine. Perhaps
if the ads had more carefully attributed the claims to the books being advertised
and to the opinions of the books' authors, the FTC would not have targeted
claims derived from the books as being false or unsubstantiated. If so, then the
Mirror Image Doctrine posed only a minor obstacle to advertising the challenged claims with absolute immunity. As long as the advertisers were not misrepresenting the content of the advertised books and they provided minimal disclosures, the advertisements in Del Dotto, WLAR, and Johnson & Collins theoretically could have been re-issued with the same false or unsubstantiated claims
derived from the books.
Because so little effort is required to comply with the Mirror Image
Doctrine, it is unclear what long-term benefit consumers derive from consent
orders that allow false or unsubstantiated claims that track claims in the underlying book. Advertisers simply need to incorporate the minimal disclosures into
the ad copy and then are able to convey their false promises with impunity.
Indeed, it would appear that the Mirror Image Doctrine provides authors of bogus weight loss systems and purveyors of get-rich-quick schemes with a roadmap to immunity from false advertising charges. Whether the FTC may abandon or relax that doctrine, however, depends upon the constraints of the First
Amendment, an issue addressed below.
IH. THE CONSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY FOR THE MIRROR IMAGE DOCTRINE
As a purely statutory matter, the FTC has the authority to regulate misleading advertisements about books. The FTC Act prohibits "deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce."' 1 1 Books are a product "in or affecting
commerce." Books, however, are also protected by the First Amendment. As
noted, unless a book is defamatory or discloses confidential information, its
ideas cannot be suppressed. 10 2 Consequently, courts have been extremely, if not
uniformly, reluctant to impose liability on a publisher for the false or misleading
content of a publication. This phenomenon is evident both inside and outside of
100
101
102

Id. at 678.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (noting that "erroneous statement

of fact is ...inevitable in free debate" and is constitutionally protected unless the law of defamation holds otherwise); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964) (same).
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the FTC enforcement context. 10 3 For example, courts have rejected the argument that an author or publisher can be sued in negligence for false or unsubstantiated claims in a book, even when the consumer was injured in reliance on
those representations.' °4 Similarly, courts have rejected a strict products liability theory of recovery against publishers of First Amendment protected products.10 5 Finally, courts have refused to hold an author liable for unsubstantiated
scientific statements in books that are arguably commercial in nature where the
book is not "merely a mask" to promote the sale of other products. 1 6
If books containing deceptive content generally are fully protected by
the First Amendment, how then can the FTC regulate a publisher for advertising
such books? Perhaps former FTC Commissioner Elman had it right in his dissent in Rodale Press when he opined that ads for books are constitutionally protected as long as they truthfully describe the book's content because the consti-

103

See supra Section II.

104 E.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that a
publisher had no legal duty to exercise due care by investigating the accuracy of The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms, which the plaintiffs consulted before consuming wild mushrooms and becoming critically ill; the First Amendment does not impose such a burden on the publisher, although
the publisher may assume such a burden, such as the Good Housekeeping Consumer's Guaranty
Seal); see also James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002) (plaintiffs sought to
attach tort liability to the communicative aspect of defendants' video games, and therefore lawsuit
posed First Amendment concerns; foregoing resolution of constitutional concerns given adequacy
of state law grounds for dismissing negligence claim; holding that it was impossible for defendants to predict the perpetrator's violent reaction to violent video games and movies).
105 E.g., Meow Media, 300 F.3d at 701 (holding that, under Kentucky law, a product must be
tangible to bring a strict liability claim; finding that the communicative content of video games,
movies, and internet transmissions are not sufficiently tangible to constitute products); Winter,
938 F.2d at 1035-36 (affirming dismissal of products liability claim where plaintiffs became severely ill from picking and eating mushrooms after relying on information in The Encyclopedia of
Mushrooms because the book "is pure thought and expression"; distinguishing book from an
aeronautical chart, a compass, and computer software that fails to work, all of which are more like
"products").
106
See Oxycal Lab., Inc. v. Jeffers, 909 F. Supp. 719, 724-26 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (denying vitamin manufacturer's preliminary injunction against author and publisher of book that claimed that
ingredient in company's vitamins causes cancer; holding that the book was non-commercial
speech because, although the book had commercial elements, its main purpose was not to promote
a commercial transaction, but to advance the author's cancer theories, and it was not for the court
to decide whether her theories lacked scientific foundation); cf Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., 52
F.3d 108, 113-14 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiff could sue for alleged misrepresentations in
defendant's journal article on the manufacturing process for beryllium-copper plunger tips because the article was commercial speech; article's numerous statements promoting plaintiff's
products were unnecessary for a discussion on the plunger tip manufacturing process); Gordon &
Breach Science Publishers S.A. v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 905 F. Supp. 169, 178 n.6 & 180
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that defendants-publishers' articles on surveys ranking their journals as
superior in price and value to plaintiffs' were more informational than commercial in nature;
however, defendants' dissemination of article preprints for promotional purposes amounted to
commercial speech for which they could be liable for alleged misrepresentations).
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tutional right to write and disseminate a book includes the right to advertise it. 10 7
This argument is explored below.
A.

Regulating False Advertising about Books as Commercial Speech

At the outset, it should be noted that few eyebrows are raised when the
government regulates fraud perpetrated through speech. The Supreme Court has
made it utterly clear that the First Amendment does not shield fraud.'0 8 Typically, a showing of fraud requires more than a showing of a false statement.
The plaintiff usually must show that the defendant made a false representation
of a material fact, knowing that the representation was false, with the intent to
mislead the listener, and the listener must have actually been misled.' °9 For the
Supreme Court, "[e]xacting proof requirements of this order ... provide sufficient breathing room for protected speech."" 0 By contrast, to prove a violation
of the FTC Act's prohibition against false advertising, the FTC, except in the
case of an advertising agency,"' need not show that the respondent knew that its
claims were false or intended to mislead consumers, nor must the FTC show12
that consumers actually relied on the false representations to their detriment."
Because the threshold for proving a violation is significantly lower in the FTC
Act context, there arguably is less breathing room for protected speech. Therefore, fraud cases are not sufficient in themselves to justify the FTC's regulation
of false advertising of products that are fully protected by the First Amendment.
A simplistic justification for the FTC's constitutional authority to regulate false advertising for books would be to adopt a rule that all advertising,
whether for a BMW or a book, is commercial speech and that if the advertisement contains deceptive claims (e.g., "From 0 to 60 in 2 seconds." or "This
book will teach you how to become a millionaire in a week."), its misleading
content can be prohibited.' 13 The initial problem with such an approach is the
difficulty of distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial speech.
107
108

In re Rodale Press, 71 F.T.C. 1184 (1967).
Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003) (citing
Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 190 (1948)); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
109
Madigan, 538 U.S. at 620 (discussing Illinois law) (citations omitted).
110 ld. (citations omitted).
III In re Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 84 F.T.C. 1401, 1475 (1974) (holding that an ad agency may
be liable for a deceptive advertisement if it actively participated in the preparation of the ad and
knew or should have known that the advertisement was false), affd and modified, 96 F.T.C. 66
(1980), affd and modified, 96 F.T.C. 380 (1980).
112
See Chrylser Corp. v. F.T.C., 561 F.2d 357, 363, 363 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Regina Corp. v.
FTC, 322 F.2d 765, 768 (3d Cir. 1963).
113
See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) (holding that misleading commercial speech is not protected by the First Amendment); see
also F.T.C. v. Trudeau, No. 03 C 3904, 2007 WL 4109607, at *5 n.7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2007)
(holding that infomercials promoting author's weight loss book were "quite clearly commercial
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In Bigelow v. Virginia,' 14 the Supreme Court recognized that advertisements (there, a newspaper advertisement for abortion services in another state)
are entitled to some degree of First Amendment protection because "[t]he relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of services does not make it
valueless in the marketplace of ideas."' 15 The next year, in Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 116 the Court held that
"speech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spent to
project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or another,"' 1 7 and that "speech
which does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction"' is commercial
speech entitled to some form of First Amendment protection. 8 The Court
noted that untruthful or misleading commercial speech may be prohibited."19
Four years later, in Central Hudson, 2 0 the Supreme Court appeared to significantly broaden the definition of commercial speech to mean "expression
related
'2
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.' '
The Court attempted to reconcile its different articulations of the commercial speech definition in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,122 which
addressed the constitutionality of a federal statute that was invoked to prohibit
the mailing of informational pamphlets about the use, manufacture, desirability,
and availability of condoms, and describing various condoms sold by the advertiser. The Court held that three facts, in combination, provided strong support
for the conclusion that the pamphlets were commercial speech: (1) they were
conceded to be advertisements; (2) one of the pamphlets referred to a specific
product; and (3) the advertiser had an economic motivation. 23 It further noted
that all three characteristics need not be present for a finding that speech is
commercial speech. 24 Of relevance to this article, the Court further opined that
"a different conclusion may be appropriate in a case where the pamphlet advertises an activity itself protected by the First Amendment.' 2 5 Six years later, the
speech" because "their entire purpose [was] to entice viewers to enter into a commercial transaction-the purchase of his book").
114 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
115
Id.at 826.
116 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
117 Id. at 761.

118 Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973)).
119 Id. at 771-72.
120 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
121

Id. at 561.

122 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
123 Id. at 66-68.
124 Id. at 67 n.14.
125 Id. (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413
(1943). The Murdock opinion, which the Court cited as support for its statement, is discussed
below.
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Court appeared to backtrack on its more nuanced definition of commercial
a commercial transacspeech, holding once again that whether speech proposes
26
tion is "the test for identifying commercial speech."'
Also relevant to this discussion is the Court's holding in Bolger regarding the protection afforded advertising that has both commercial and noncommercial elements. The Court held that the informational pamphlets about
condoms were commercial speech "notwithstanding the fact that they discussed
important public issues such as venereal disease and family planning."' 127 The
Court "made clear that advertising which 'links a product to a current public
debate' is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech.' 28 Because an advertiser enjoys full First Amendment protection for its "direct comments on public issues," the Court found "no reason for
when such statements are made in the
providing similar constitutional protection
129
transactions."
commercial
of
context
In subsequent decisions, the Court elaborated on the protection afforded
speech that has both commercial and non-commercial elements. In Riley v. National Federationof the Blind of North Carolina,Inc., 130 the Court struck down
a state law requiring professional fundraisers to disclose to potential donors the
percentage of donations actually turned over to the charity. Here, the Court
refused to parcel out the commercial component of the speech (the solicitation
for money) from the non-commercial, informational component, holding instead
that speech loses its commercial character "when it is inextricably intertwined
with otherwise fully protected speech."' 3 1 Distinguishing Riley, the Court in Bd.
of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 132 addressed the constitutionality
of a university resolution that was applied to prohibit Tupperware parties in a
campus dormitory. The plaintiffs argued that the Tupperware parties consisted
of commercial speech (the selling of housewares) that was inextricably intertwined with non-commercial speech (information on how to be financially responsible and how to run an efficient home) and, therefore, the speech at issue
126

Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989) (citing Posadas

de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986)). See also City
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423 (1993) (noting that in Fox, the Court
"character[ized] the proposal of a commercial transaction as 'the test for identifying commercial
speech"') (quoting Fox, 492 U.S. at 473-74).
127 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67.
128
Id. at 68 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 563 n.5 (1980).
129 Id. (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563, n.5).
130 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
131 Id. at 796 ("Regulation of a solicitation must be undertaken with due regard for the reality
that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech,
and for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would
likely cease.") (internal quotation marks, punctuation, and citations omitted).
132
Bd. of Tr. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
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was fully protected under the First Amendment. 33 The Court rejected this argument and held that the speech at issue was commercial speech, reasoning:
[T]here is nothing whatever "inextricable" about the noncommercial aspects of these presentations. No law of man or of nature makes it impossible to sell housewares without teaching
home economics, or to teach home economics without selling
housewares. Nothing in the resolution prevents the speaker
from conveying, or the audience from hearing, these noncommercial messages, and nothing in the nature of things
requires
134
them to be combined with commercial messages.
If, as the Supreme Court held, speech which proposes a commercial
transaction is the test for commercial speech, then the FTC may be conceding
away its regulatory authority by adhering to the Mirror Image Doctrine. An ad
that proposes the sale of any product-whether its contents are protected by the
First Amendment or not-must constitute commercial speech under the Court's
commercial transaction test. An advertisement that proposes the sale of a product fully protected by the First Amendment, such as a "how to" book, fits the
simple definition.
Then again, for ads relating to books, such an advertisement likely will
refer to or incorporate fully protected speech, namely, references to the fully
protected content of the book. For example, if a book that purports to provide
various home remedies for cancer is fully protected speech, then an advertisement claiming that the book contains home remedies for cancer would seem to
be inextricably intertwined with the book. Although one could sell Tupperware
without discussing home economics, it would be difficult to advertise a book
about cancer cures without discussing the book and the advice it purports to give
the reader. Thus, the commercial content and the fully protected content may be
inextricably intertwined. If so, the Mirror Image Doctrine may strike the appropriate constitutional balance by holding advertisers liable for false advertising
only if the advertisement misrepresents the content of the book, not if the advertising claims themselves, which mirror the fully protected content of the book,
are unsubstantiated.
It is important to remember, however, that the "inextricably intertwined" rule from Riley arose in the context of governmental attempts to regu133

Id. at 474.

134

Id.; cf Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 677-79 (2003) (Breyer, J., joined by O'Connor, J.,

dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari as improvidently granted) (noting that the noncommercial characteristics of Nike's letter to the editor responding to charges that it was mistreating
and underpaying its foreign workers was "inextricably intertwined" with the commercial characteristics, because the letter was (1) "outside a traditional advertising format, such as a brief television or newspaper advertisement"; (2) did not "propose the presentation or sale of a product or
any other commercial transaction"; (3) centrally, not peripherally, concerned a matter of significant public interest).
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late charitable solicitations, which are inherently different than the more impersonal print, radio, or Internet advertising for a book. Unlike advertising in general, the purpose of which is to convey information about a product or service,
face-to-face charitable solicitation itself is core First Amendment activity. As
the Supreme Court has commented:
Prior authorities... clearly establish that charitable appeals for
funds, on the street or door to door, involve a variety of speech
interests-communication of information, the dissemination
and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of
causes-that are within the protection of the First Amendment.
...[B]ecause charitable solicitation does more than inform private economic decisions and is not primarily concerned with
providing information about the characteristics and costs of
goods and services, it has not been dealt with in [the Supreme
3
Court's] cases as a variety of purely commercial speech.1
In contrast, advertisements for weight loss books or get-rich-quick
schemes are not primarily concerned with advocacy, but with providing information that will entice the consumer to undertake a private economic decisionthe purchase of a book. Thus, the Supreme Court's professed unwillingness to
parcel out commercial messages that are inextricably intertwined with noncommercial messages may not apply to book advertising, which arguably lies in
a fainter area of the penumbra of First Amendment values.
Typical book advertising also appears farther from the core of the First
Amendment when compared to door-to-door religious evangelism, which also is
fully protected by the First Amendment even when accompanied by a request
for money. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania,136 the Supreme Court addressed a First
Amendment challenge to an ordinance that required all persons soliciting orders
for merchandise of any kind to obtain and pay for a license. The petitioners were
Jehovah's Witnesses who had distributed literature door-to-door and solicited
people to purchase certain religious books and pamphlets. 137 In connection with
these activities, the petitioners had played a record expounding certain of their
views on religion. 138 None of them had obtained a license under the ordinance,
and they were arrested after selling their religious books. 3 9
The Court acknowledged that "when a religious sect uses 'ordinary
commercial methods of sales of articles to raise propaganda funds,' it is proper

135 Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
136 319 U.S. 105, 106 (1943).
137 Id.
138 Id. at 107.
139

Id.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2008

21

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 5

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 110

for the state to charge 'reasonable fees for the privilege of canvassing. '" ' 140 The
Court doubted, however, whether the petitioners were actually selling the books,
because it was their practice in making these solicitations to request a "contribution" for the books and pamphlets and to accept lesser sums or even to donate
the volumes in case an interested person was without funds. 141 Moreover, the
Court found that the petitioners' practice of hand distribution of religious tracts
was an age-old form of missionary evangelism that "occupies the same high
estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching
from the pulpits.' ' 142 The mere fact that the religious literature was sold by itinerant preachers rather than donated did not transform their evangelism into a
commercial enterprise. 143 The Court therefore held that the petitioners did not
become "mere book agent[s] by selling the Bible or religious tracts to help defray his expenses or to sustain" them because "it plainly [could] not be said that
'44
petitioners were engaged in a commercial rather than a religious venture."1
For the Court, it would have been "a distortion of the facts of record to describe
their activities as the occupation of selling books and pamphlets.1 45
Internet and print advertisements for books touting rapid weight loss
without diet or exercise are inherently different from evangelistic speech that
may involve the exchange of money for a religious tract. The primary, if not
exclusive, purpose of ads for weight loss books are to encourage people to engage in a commercial transaction, i.e., to buy the book. By contrast, the evangelistic speech is motivated exclusively by non-commercial motivations, i.e., to
convey religious doctrine and to solicit funds in order to finance further evangelizing. There is no air of commerce. In fact, the monetary solicitation is a
necessary component of religious expression, akin to passing around the collection plate at church. Whereas the weight loss ads are a commercial means to a
non-commercial end, the evangelical speech is a non-commercial end in itself,
and there is no clear way to parcel the monetary from the religious components
of such speech. Not so with a weight loss advertisement, which clearly can be
distinguished from the fully protected product that it promotes. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court's professed reluctance to parse commercial from noncommercial messages does not necessarily apply with equal force to claims contained in an offer to sell a weight loss book, even when those claims are inextricably intertwined with messages excerpted from that book.
Indeed, three Supreme Court cases, read in conjunction, suggest that the
fact that the product or service being advertised is itself fully protected speech
does not necessitate a finding that the advertising for that product or service is
140

Id. at 110 (quoting Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 597 (1942)).

141
142

Id. at 107.
Id. at 108-09.

143

Id. at 111.

144 Id.
145

Id.
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fully protected. First, in Fox, the Court noted the distinction between for-profit
speech, such as legal or medical advice, which is fully protected by the Consti147
tution, 146 and speech which proposes a commercial transaction, which is not.
Second, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 148 the Court held that advertising for
legal services is commercial speech and noted that false, deceptive, or misleading advertising of legal services can be prohibited. 149 Third, in Zauderer v. Office of DisciplinaryCounsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio,150 the Court held that
statements contained in an advertisement for legal services regarding the legal
rights of persons injured by the Dalkon shield normally would be fully protected
speech, but not when presented in the context of an advertisement.1 51 The lawyer's advertisements were "advertising pure and simple;" the ads were commercial speech because they proposed a commercial transaction-the offer of legal
representation. 52 Bates, Zauderer, and Fox show that advertising for a service
that is fully protected by the First Amendment constitutes commercial speech
because the advertisement is a solicitation to sell that service. 53 Although
speech elements of an advertisement, when viewed in isolation, might be fully
protected, those elements do not alter the inherently commercial character of the
vehicle used to communicate those elements, namely, an offer to sell that speech
for a fee.
The same logic would appear to apply to advertisements for products,
such as books, which are fully protected speech, versus solicitations to sell those
books for a price. Claims about cures for cancer or weight loss lose their fully
protected status when they are married with an offer to sell additional information pertaining to those claims for a fee. Although derived from a fully pro-

146

See Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 953-54 (7th Cir. 2000) ("The right to hire and consult

an attorney is protected by the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech, association and
petition.") (citing DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990)); Martin v. Lauer, 686
F.2d 24, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
147
See, Bd. of Tr. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989) (holding that "legal
advice, and medical consultation provided (for a fee) ... consist of speech for a profit, [but] they
do not consist of speech that proposes a commercial transaction, which is what defines commercial speech") (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 761 (1976)).
148

433 U.S. 350 (1977).

149

Id. at 382.

150

471 U.S. 626 (1985).

151 Id. at 637 n.7.
152

Id. at 637.

153

Cf.Rushman v. City of Milwaukee, 959 F. Supp. 1040, 1043-44 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (holding

that city could not regulate speech
posal of a commercial transaction:
additional transaction. In contrast,
could remove them, that would be
sell her curse-lifting services.").

of an astrologer, unless the targeted speech involved the pro"[A]n astrologer's advice neither proposes nor encourages an
if [the astrologer] told her clients that they had curses and she
commercial speech because she would be using astrology to
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tected source, the claims, when placed in an advertisement, convey ideas about
the book as a product available for purchase, just like legal services.
One Second Circuit case has recognized a constitutionally significant
distinction between a book and the advertising about the book as a product.
Groden v. Random House, Inc. 154 involved the publication of a book by Gerald
Posner called Case Closed, which "attempts to refute the numerous conspiracy
theories about the Kennedy assassination and concludes that the Warren Commission correctly determined that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone in shooting
the President."' 155 An ad for Posner's book in The New York Times contained the
names, photographs, and quotations of six authors whose books had advocated a
conspiracy theory behind the assassination. Above the six pictures was the headline, "GUILTY OF MISLEADING THE AMERICAN PUBLIC." 156 One of the
pictured authors was Robert Groden, and next to his picture was a quotation
from his own book, succinctly stating his conspiracy theory behind the assassination. 157 The ad also contained the claim "ONE MAN. ONE GUN. ONE
INESCAPABLE CONCLUSION."' 158 Groden brought a Lanham Act claim
against the publisher,
contending that the advertising statements about Posner's
159
book were false.
The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment against Groden because the advertising claims were neither literally false nor likely to mislead or
confuse consumers. 16 ° The court ruled that the "GUILTY OF MISLEADING
THE AMERICAN PUBLIC" claim was "obviously a statement of opinion that
could not reasonably be seen as stating or implying provable facts" about the
plaintiff-author's work. 161 Further, the statement "ONE MAN. ONE GUN.
ONE INESCAPABLE CONCLUSION" accurately described the thesis of Case
Closed.162 "No matter what the true facts might be concerning the Kennedy
163
assassination, the ad's statements said nothing false about Posner's book."'
The court elaborated:
[I]t is important to distinguish between advertising statements
made to summarize an argument or opinion within a book and
those made about a book as a product. The former are essentially a matter of argument, to be accepted or rejected by those
154

61 F.3d 1045 (2d Cir. 1995).

'55

Id. at 1048.
id.

156
157

Id.

158

Id.

159

Id. at 1051.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1052.
Id.

160
161

162
163

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss2/5

24

Fentonmiller: Reflections on the Mirror Image Doctrine: Should the Federal Trad

2008]

REFLECTIONS ON THE MIRROR IMAGE DOCTRINE

who read the book, while the latter might often be statements of
fact that might be verifiable. Only in the latter case will the
statements possibly violate the Lanham Act.164
Groden can be read to suggest that the Mirror Image Doctrine correctly
defines the FTC's constitutional authority to regulate book advertising. An advertisement that claims that a 200-page book will teach readers how to improve
their vision or to speed-read arguably is unassailable as long as the book itself
covers such topics in 200 pages. Alternatively, claims about a book as a product
may encompass more than claims about the book's physical, or easily verifiable,
attributes such as page numbers or subject matter. For example, a claim that a
200-page book will teach you to lose significant weight might be objectively
true only if both (a) the book contains 200 pages of instructions on the subject of
weight loss, and (b) the typical person following the instructions will lose
weight. Both of these claims are objectively verifiable, and the truth of both
claims is important to the consumer. The only difference between the claims is
that the former can be verified simply by looking at the book. The latter claim
may require more work to verify, such as consultation with the scientific literature or medical testing. But this practical distinction does not detract from the
objectively verifiable nature of both claims.
The latter, more expansive interpretation of claims about a book "as a
product" is consistent with Groden's specific holding. Because the truth behind
Kennedy's assassination can never truly be known in a scientific sense, the court
naturally was reluctant to pick among competing historical viewpoints. Health
benefit claims, however, are capable of scientific verification. The techniques
outlined in the book either lead to improved vision or reading speed, or they do
not. The claims are not a matter of unverifiable argument, but are verifiable
hypotheses. Moreover, the accuracy of the hypotheses is material to consumers;
they rely on the apparent truth of the claims in making decisions about their
health, in the same way that an advertising claim about the accuracy of a thermometer would lead consumers to believe that the thermometer will give them a
true reading of their temperature. According to this interpretation of Groden,
165
the health benefit claims in advertising are "made about a book as a product,"'
and can be regulated without violating the First Amendment.
A few state cases have addressed the validity of attempts to impose
false advertising liability on publishers who disseminated misleading, objectively verifiable claims. Lacoff v. Buena Vista Publ'g, Inc.166 involved a consumer class action alleging fraud against publishers of The Beardstown Ladies'
Common-Sense Investment Guide. The complaint alleged that the publisher had
164 ld; accord Lane v. Random House, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 141, 152 (D.D.C. 1995) (libel case
based on same advertisement at issue in Groden case; holding that ad was fully-protected speech
because it summarized an argument or opinion contained in the book).
165
Groden, 61 F.3d at 1052 (emphasis omitted and added).
166 705 N.Y.S.2d 183 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
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engaged in false advertising and fraud by claiming on the book's cover and
elsewhere that the sixteen women calling themselves the Beardstown Ladies had
achieved an annual rate of return of 23.4% over a ten-year period, because their
actual return was 9.1%.167
The court noted that full free speech protections extend to works that
provide entertainment and amusement, as well as those that provide instruction
and advice, such as "how to" books. 168 Consequently, the books' authors were
entitled to protection from erroneous statements of fact. 169 Moreover, the publisher was entitled to full First Amendment protection for its advertising claim
made on the book's cover because the claim corresponded directly with the fully
protected content of the book. 170 Although acknowledging that the advertising
claim had a commercial speech element in that it was intended to entice readers
to buy the book, the claim also had "content-related expression, which is entitled to full First Amendment protection.' ' 171 Like the court in Groden, the court
distinguished between advertising claims that summarize an argument or opinion within a book and those made about a book as a product.172 The court held
that, because the book cover states a fact made by the authors in the text, the
claim on the book cover is not about the book as a product.173 The court further
held that advertising that promotes noncommercial speech is accorded the same
constitutional protection as the speech it advertises and is actionable only if it
fails to accurately reflect the contents of the protected speech being promoted. 174
Lacoff effectively held that the Mirror Image Doctrine demarcates the
constitutional limits on false advertising claims about a book. Liability attaches
only where advertising claims fail to correspond with the content of the book; it
is inappropriate to inquire into the veracity of the claims themselves. Notably,
although the court discussed Groden's distinction between advertising claims
that summarize a book's arguments and claims about the book as a product, the
court failed to acknowledge Groden's additional distinction between claims that
are objectively verifiable (i.e., market performance) and those that are not (i.e.,
the perpetrator(s) behind the Kennedy assassination). As discussed above,
Groden can be read to suggest that the advertisement of objectively verifiable
claims, such as claims about investment returns, can be regulated for false or
misleading content.
Lacoff is by no means the final word on this constitutional question. It
directly conflicts with the decision of the California Court of Appeals in Keimer
167

Id. at 186.

172

Id. at 188.
Id.
Id. at 189-92.
Id. at 190 (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989)).
Id.(quoting Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045, 1052 (2d Cir. 1995)).

173

Id.

168
169
170
171

174 Id. at 190-91 (citations omitted).
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v. Buena Vista Books, Inc.175 Keimer involved a single plaintiff action against
the publisher of The Beardstown Ladies' Common-Sense Investment Guide and
176
a video entitled The Beardstown Ladies-Cookin' Up Profits on Wall Street.
The packaging of these materials contained claims such as "23.4% Annual Return" and "learn how to outperform mutual funds and professional money managers 3 to 1.,,177The publisher moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the allegedly false advertising statements on the book and videotape covers
were taken directly from information contained in the materials themselves and,
78
therefore, the statements were absolutely protected by the First Amendment.
Although the trial court dismissed the complaint, the court of appeals reversed
because the entire purpose of the advertising statements "was to urge the public
to buy the books, that is, to propose a commercial transaction."' 179 The court
noted that the cover satisfied the three Bolger characteristics of commercial
speech in that (1) the publisher conceded that the covers were advertisements;
(2) the covers referred to a specific product, namely, the book; and (3) the publisher had an economic motivation to make the statements on the cover. 180 Because the covers were commercial speech, they could be attacked as false and
misleading under California's Unfair Trade Practices Act, which imposes liability upon an advertiser for untrue or misleading statements.1 8'
The court also rejected the argument, later adopted by the New York
trial court in Lacoff, that the advertising material was entitled to full First
Amendment protection simply because the underlying book being advertised
was fully protected. 8 2 The court, however, never provided a principled basis
for rejecting this argument, merely holding
that the publishers had failed to cite
83
any persuasive supporting authority. 1
Another panel of the California Court of Appeals subsequently suggested in a different case that advertising claims that mirror the content of fully
protected speech would be fully protected. In Rezec v. Sony Pictures Enter175 75 Cal. App. 4th 1220 (1999).
176
Id. at 1224.
177 Id.
178
Id. at 1225.
179

Id.

at 1229.

180 Id.
181 Id. at 1230-31.
182

183

Id. at 1231-32.
Id.at 1231 ("[A] review of [the publisher] Disney's authorities reveals that each is materi-

ally distinguishable from the matter before us in one of two ways. They either involved advertising statements which were true, or were opinion or 'rhetorical hyperbole' and thus were not verifiably false or misleading, as were the investment return figures here; or they involved the infringement on rights which are less zealously protected than the right of consumers to be free from
false advertising. Furthermore, the bulk of the cases relied on by Disney were resolved on summary judgment, where the court was properly called upon to make a decision based upon evidence
presented, whereas we are bound by the complaint's allegations and matters judicially noticed.").
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tainment, Inc., 184 the court held that the First Amendment did not preclude the
plaintiff film viewers from suing a motion picture studio for false advertising
where the studio's commercials for several movies had invoked favorable quotations of a fictitious movie critic. 185 The court reasoned that generally an advertisement reflecting the content of a film would be fully protected, noncommercial speech, just like the film itself, but that principle was irrelevant on the
peculiar facts of the case because the challenged portion of the ads "did not reflect any character or186portion of the films," but a fictitious critic's favorable
opinions of the films.
As in Keimer, the Illinois Court of Appeals appeared to draw a similar
distinction between fully protected ideas contained in a book and the advertising
designed to promote the sales of the book. Hartiganv. MacLean Hunger Publ'g
Corp.187 involved an action by Illinois' Attorney General challenging the advertising of a manual of vehicle pricing information entitled the Red Book. The
Attorney General alleged, inter alia, that the publishers falsely advertised that
the Red Book contained "official used car valuations"; the information contained
in the Red Book was "complete," "current," "dependable," "impartial," "accurate," and "reliable"; and the Red Book provided "average finance," "average
wholesale," and "average retail" values. 188 The circuit court dismissed the ac189
tion for failure to state a claim, citing potential First Amendment concerns.
On appeal, the court of appeals noted that the publisher's intent was "to further
sales of Red Book by inducing prospective purchasers to believe that the information which Red Book contains is based on extensive market research and actual transactions." 190 The court held that the advertising was not designed to
promote ideas qua ideas" where "the dissemination of ideas [was] so invested
with a financial interest."'19 1 Consequently, the advertising, which contained
representations concerning the qualities of a product and promoting92 its use,
could be regulated under Illinois' statute against deceptive advertising.'
To summarize, although what little authority exists is mixed, there is a
reasonable argument that the FTC can prohibit false claims in book advertisements that promise certain types of objectively verifiable results to consumers
(e.g., substantial weight loss, vastly improved vision) because they constitute
misleading commercial speech. Although commercial speech is entitled to full
First Amendment protection when it is inextricably intertwined with fully pro184
185
186

187

116 Cal. App. 4th 135 (2004).
Id. at 142-43.
Id.
App. Ct. 1983).
457 N.E.2d 480 (Ill.

188 Id. at 482.
189 Id. at 484.
190

Id.

191

Id.

192

Id. at 485.
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tected speech, that rule arose from cases involving face-to-face, charitable or
religious solicitation, which is a core First Amendment activity. In those speech
contexts, the speaker's motivation is to convey ideas and convince the listener
and to solicit money to further more non-commercial speech. Advertising for
books that promise increased wealth or decreased weight, however, typically are
not intended to convince or persuade in themselves, but to entice consumers into
making a purchase that purportedly will lead to certain objectively verifiable
benefits. The few state court cases to have broached the issue have reached
mixed results, differing over whether advertising for a product fully protected
by the First Amendment and the product itself enjoy the same level of constitutional protection. In this author's opinion, the better view is that book advertising that promises to deliver a concrete result for a price is a patently commercial
solicitation. Accordingly, the FTC can prohibit claims in such advertising that
amount to false commercial promises.
This enforcement approach would not be without its difficult cases. For
instance, an advertisement for a book on "psychic health" may promise to deliver a feeling of well-being and inner peace through a ten-step process. Certainly, that feeling is a concrete result, perhaps even a more desirable result than
extreme wealth or a narrow waist. That feeling, however, may be difficult to
quantify objectively, making it difficult to prove or disprove the promise in the
advertising. On the other hand, if an ad for a book promises to cure a particular
psychiatric condition-e.g., a depressive disorder-that promise might be more
amenable to objective verification. Thus, the domain of book advertising cases
that the FTC might choose to pursue, if unconstrained by the Mirror Image Doctrine, necessarily would depend on the particularity of the advertising claims,
the relative difficulty of verifying those claims objectively, and the potential
harm to consumers should the claims be allowed to persist in the marketplace.
B.

Regulating FalseAdvertising about Books as Commercial Conduct

As discussed in the preceding section, the categorization of false claims
in book advertising as commercial speech relies on characterizing those claims
as false commercial promises. An advertisement like The System for Better
Sight promises the consumer that by purchasing the book and following its instructions, he or she will achieve a particular result (vastly improved vision).
When confronted with such advertising, a consumer's expectations are linked
with that concrete result. Although the consumer will have to utilize his or her
reading comprehension skills in order to process the information in the book, the
consumer who responds favorably to the ad likely is not interested in purchasing
the book for contemplation purposes, but to obtain a set of instructions that, if
followed, will dramatically improve his or her vision. These consumers are not
interested in the communicative aspect of the book, but in its functional aspect.
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Although the functional aspect of a "how to" book cannot be regulated
directly for false content, 193 if that book is advertised and the advertisement
claims that use of the book is efficacious for a particular purpose in order to
induce a purchase, the book is not inherently different than any other product
that is advertised for a price in the marketplace of commerce. When the FTC
regulates such false advertising claims, it is ensuring that the functional aspect
of the book actually delivers the promised result. In this vein, the FTC's regulation targets the expressive content of the book only as an incident to a speechneutral effort to ensure that the book, as a product, functions as promised in the
advertisement. As explored below, the FTC's regulation of false advertising
claims about books arguably is constitutional as a permissible form of regulating
the offer and acceptance process between buyers and sellers.
Perhaps the most stark illustration of the distinction between speech's
communicative and functional components is in the realm of computer software.
Several courts have held that computer programming language which directs a
computer's microprocessor to execute instructions-"source code194-is protected by the First Amendment.1 9 Although source code has functional characteristics, in that it represents commands to a machine, it also has communicative
elements, in that the code is a method of communicating ideas about computer
programming among computer programmers.
Source code is analogous to a
musical score, which represents a series of commands to be executed on a musical instrument, but also constitutes a means of communication among musicians. 197
Courts have held that, just because computer source code has a fully
protected speech element, it does not follow that the advertising of a computer
program, which is comprised of source code, is likewise fully protected. Com193

See supra text accompanying notes 102-06.

194

The Sixth Circuit provided a concise definition of "source code" in Junger v. Daley, 209

F.3d 481, 483 (6th Cir. 2000):
[C]omputer software, can be in one of two forms: object code or source code.
Object code represents computer instructions as a sequence of binary digits
(Os and Is) that can be directly executed by a computer's microprocessor.
Source code represents the same instructions in a specialized programming
language, such as BASIC, C, or Java. Individuals familiar with a particular
computer programming language can read and understand source code.
Source code, however, must be converted into object code before a computer
will execute the software's instructions. This conversion is conducted by
compiler software.
195 Id. at 485; see also DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 10 (Cal. 2003)
(holding that computer code, and computer programs constructed from code, can merit First
Amendment protection).
196 See Junger, 209 F.3d at 484 (noting that the source code for encryption software can convey
information and ideas about cryptography and can be used by programmers and scholars for such
informational purposes).
197

Id. at 484.
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involved a civil enforcement action by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") against three
defendants for, among other things, fraudulently advertising a computer program called "Recurrence."' ' 99 The defendants marketed Recurrence as a system,
originally in book form and then later comprised of computer software. 200 The
defendants told their customers to feed current market prices for certain future
contracts (separately obtained from a market reporting service) into a computer
loaded with the Recurrence program. 20 1 Recurrence would then analyze the
transactions taking place in the futures market and give the user instantaneous
"buy" or "sell" signals. 20 2 The defendants claimed that, used in this manner,
Recurrence would allow users to trade futures profitably.20 3 An advertisement
for Recurrence stated: "You'll be advised on what pattern is present, at what
price to buy or sell, at what price to place your protective stop, and where to
modity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Vartuli

take profits ....

All the trader needs to do is call [his or her] broker and place

the appropriate trades. 2 °4 Other ads claimed that the system turned a $10,000
investment into $544,794, a return of 833% per year, and had turned $2,500 into
well over $130,000.205 The defendants failed to disclose that these claims were
based on a computer-generated hypothetical use of the Recurrence system. 206
The results of actual trading as directed by the Recurrence system resulted in
substantial losses.20 7
The Second Circuit held that the defendants could be held liable for
making false and misleading representations to customers regarding the past
profitability and track record of Recurrence without running afoul of the First
Amendment.20 8 The court reasoned that these statements were made in an effort
to induce customers to purchase the program and follow Recurrence's recommendations and, therefore, could be regulated as fraudulent conduct. 2°9 Moreover, the defendants could be held liable for fraudulent advertising because the
CFTC's action did not target "statements made by Recurrence, but those made
in the advertisements for Recurrence., 2 10 Because "[t]hese communications
198
199

228 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 97-98.

200

Id. at 98.

201

Id.

202

Id.

203
204

Id. at 98-99.
ld. at 99.

205

Id.

206

208

Id.
Id. at 99-100.
Id. at 108.

209

Id. ("It has long been understood that such '[f]rauds may be denounced as offenses and

207

punished by law."') (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939)).
210
Id.
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about Recurrence did 'no more than propose a commercial transaction' between the defendants and their prospective customers, the statements were
commercial speech, and misleading commercial speech is not protected by the
First Amendment.2 '
Implicit in the court's holding was the rationale that advertising is per
se commercial speech, even if there is a colorable argument that the object of
the advertisement is a product that enjoys the full protection of the First Amendment. Assuming the Vartuli court's test for commercial speech is correct, then
misrepresentations in advertising about the efficacy of a dietary regimen or disease cures set forth in a book and made in an effort to induce customers to purchase the book also should be proscribable as a form of fraudulent conduct. If
the misrepresentations appear in advertising for the book, though not the book
itself, they could be prohibited as misleading commercial speech.
Caution may be warranted before extending Vartuli's reasoning to the
area of deceptive advertising generally. Vartuli was a commodities fraud case.
The statute under which the defendants were sued made it unlawful to defraud a
person in connection with the order or sale of a futures commodity.21 2 The court
found that the defendants' misrepresentations were not just about the Recurrence software, but about all the specific trades that the Recurrence software
directed users to execute. Consequently, "[t]he intended and direct link between
the advertisements and the currency trading rendered any misrepresentations in
the advertising 'in connection with' the suggested futures transactions. 2 3
The typical false advertising case, by contrast, does not necessarily involve fraud. As noted above, to prove a violation of the FTC Act, the FTC usually need not show that the respondent knew that its claims were false or intended to mislead consumers, nor must the FTC show that consumers actually
relied on the false representations to their detriment.2 4 Moreover, the typical
false advertising case for the FTC does not implicate the agency's authority to
regulate specific types of commercial transactions like the CFTC's authority to
regulate the trading of commodities futures. The seller of a diet book need not
register with the FTC or comply with complex reporting and other regulatory
requirements. He or she need only find someone willing to publish his or her
book and a willing buyer.
Yet, the fact that Vartuli was grounded on fraud allegations and arose in
the commodities trading context may not be constitutionally significant. Even
the most basic purchase-and-sale transaction is subject to significant governmental regulation, regardless of whether one party is trying to defraud the other.
For example, the Uniform Commercial Code governs, on a state-by-state basis,
211

Id. (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc, 425 U.S.

748, 762 (1976)) (citations omitted).
212 Id. at 101 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(i)).
213

Id.

214

See supra text accompanying notes 108-12.
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transactions in goods 215 between buyers and sellers. Books would appear to fit
within the UCC's broad definition of "goods., 2 16 The UCC imposes statute of
frauds rec uirements; 21 7 provides rules on contract formation, 21contract interpretation,119 contract modification and rescission, 220 and manner of performance; 22 1 contains gap-filling provisions for contracts that are silent on particular
terms, 222 including price; 22 imposes an obligation of good faith in the perform225
224
prohibits the enforcement of unconscionable contracts;
ance of contracts;

and specifies available damages in the event of a breach,226 including remedies
for misrepresentation or fraud.227 The UCC also imposes warranty requirements
on the seller.22 8 Thus, "[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller
to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation
or promise.,, 229 Additionally, the seller is bound to an implied warranty of merchantability, 230 including the warranty that the goods "conform to the promise or
affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any., 231 State common law
of contract also regulates commercial transactions, imposing requirements of
consideration and mutuality, and providing rules against enforcing contracts that
are unconscionable or that are premised on a mistake of the parties, material
misrepresentations, or fraud.
Viewed in this light, even commercial transactions that do not involve
commodities trading or securities trading are subject to significant governmental
regulations that do not offend the First Amendment. Accordingly, there may be
no principled reason to not extend Vartuli's holding that the advertisement of a

215

U.C.C. § 2-102 (2003).

216

Id. § 2-105 ("Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are

movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the
price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and things in action.).
217
Id. § 2-201.
218 Id. §§ 2-204 to 2-207.

223

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

224

Id. § 1-304.

225

Id. § 2-302.
Id. §§ 2-708 to 2-719.
Id. § 2-721.
Id. § 2-313.
Id. § 2-313(1)(a).
Id. § 2-314(1).
Id. § 2-314(2)(f).

219
220
221
222

226
227
228
229
230
231

§ 2-208.
§ 2-209.
§§ 2-307 to 2-311.
§ 2-204.
§ 2-305.
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First Amendment-protected product can be regulated for false or misleading
content.
Caution about extending Vartuli beyond its facts may be warranted for
another, more metaphysical, reason: the role of free will. After holding that
Recurrence's advertising was merely commercial speech, the court went on to
hold that Recurrence itself was not constitutionally protected speech.232 The
court found it significant that Recurrence was not sold "as a learning program,
or an editorial, or an informational newsletter, but as a 'system' and 'trading
program.' ' 233 Users were instructed that the system operated automatically.
When the system ordered users to buy, they were to buy. When ordered to sell,
they were to sell. "The customer or 'client' was to be an automaton, mechanically following Recurrence's commands," no different in kind than if Recurrence had signaled electronically-triggered trades.2 34 Because there was no "intercession of the mind or the will" in processing Recurrence's speech, the court
categorized it as "non-speech behavior," which is not entitled to special First
Amendment protection. 235
"How to" books touting various regimens to cure disease, improve the
body, or increase wealth arguably function like Recurrence's system for futures
trading. Such books have a functional component, in that they instruct readers
to undertake or avoid certain behaviors in order to achieve the desired result,
just like Recurrence instructed users to buy or sell futures. These books often
may be touted as a "system" for weight loss or wealth accumulation, which, if
scrupulously followed, will lead to the promised result. Does this mean that
such books are akin to non-speechlike commands and can be regulated as a form
of conduct?
Not necessarily. "How to" books usually have a communicative element
because, in addition to outlining a system, they convey ideas about the theories
underpinning the promised benefit, whether it be the cure of a particular disease,
losing weight, or becoming a millionaire. The reader can consider these descriptions and theories and form an independent opinion about them. They are
not necessarily commands to be followed mindlessly. The advice itself, independent of its theoretical moorings, also is subject to contemplation by the human mind. Importantly, the Vartuli court stated that even Recurrence's nonspeechlike commands could be protected speech to those purchasers who used it
as a source of information and advice.236 It would seem that purchasers of "how
to" books would be even more likely to use the books as a source of information
and advice, entitling such speech to a least some degree of First Amendment
protection.
232

Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Vartuli, 228 F.3d 94, 111 (2d. Cir. 2000).

233

Id.

234

Id.

235

Id.

236

Id.at 111-12.
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The Second Circuit grappled with these issues again in Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley,237 which involved an action by several motion picture
studios to enjoin Internet website owners from posting for downloading computer software that decrypted digitally-encrypted movies on DVD's and from
including hyperlinks to other websites that made decryption software available.
One of the defendants, James Corley, wrote and placed on his website, which
catered to computer "hackers," an article about the decryption software.238 The
article described how the movie industry's decryption software had been
cracked and the industry's efforts to shut down websites posting the software.239
At the end of the article, Corely posted copies of the object and source code of
the decryption program. 24°
Consistent with other courts to have addressed the issue, the Second
Circuit held that the object and source code of computer software is protected by
the First Amendment, much like mathematical formulae and musical scores,
which are written in codes, and which similarly are protected speech. 241 Although acknowledging that computer programs are essentially just "instructions
to a computer," they nevertheless are constitutionally protected because "[e]ven
dry information, devoid of advocacy, political relevance, or artistic expression,
has been accorded First Amendment protection. 24 2 Moreover, the court held
that, because computer software has the capacity to convey information to human beings (mostly to computer programmers), it does not lose its First
Amendment protection merely because it has a functional
component as well243
i.e., the capacity to direct the functioning of a computer.
The court then held that its holding in Vartuli was fully consistent with
the fact that computer software is fully protected speech. 244 The court reasoned
that the Vartuli court properly denied First Amendment protection to the Recurrence program because of the manner in which the defendants had marketed the
software and intended that it be used, specifically, that users follow Recurrence's commands "'mechanically"' and "'without the intercession of the mind
or the will of the recipient.' 245 This holding in Vartuli, according to the Corely
court, did not translate into a conclusion that such software is never constitutionally protected. Such software would be protected where the program is used
as a source of information and advice by either the purchaser of the program or

238

273 F.3d 429 (2d. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 439.

239

Id.

240

Id.
Id. at 445-46.

237

241
242
243

244

245

Id. at 446 (citation omitted).
Id. at 447-48.
Id. at 449.
Id. (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Vartuli, 228 F.3d 94, 111 (2d Cir.

2000).
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a computer programmer. 24 Since this rule's application would appear to be
heavily dependent upon the practices of actual consumers or programmers, it is
questionable whether it represents a workable standard and, in any event,
whether it would afford software developers much confidence regarding the
constitutional protection applicable to their speech.
Again, this case law arguably has implications for the regulation of false
or deceptive advertising of weight loss or get-rich-quick systems. Often, these
systems are marketed as a step-by-step approach to achieving the desired result,
with no need for the user to exercise his or her discretion. The advertising markets the system with the intent that it be followed mechanically. In this way, the
advertising touts the functional component of the speech that comprises the system. Notwithstanding that the system, which is conveyed through words, also
has a communicative component, regulation of the manner in which the functional component
is advertised arguably does not implicate the First Amend247
all.
at
ment
The FTC's attempt to regulate false, objectively verifiable claims about
a weight loss system or get-rich-quick scheme could be viewed as akin to the
power of the state to regulate commercial transactions. The FTC's regulatory
authority does not target the ideas or theories as ideas or theories, but the
claimed functional component of the system (e.g., "If you follow these instructions, you will ... lose substantial body fat... become a millionaire within a
month.").248 Such regulation targets not the system itself but the false promises
or warranties about the system, which because of their presence in a commercial
solicitation, become part of the basis of the bargain between the advertiser and
the publisher. Regulation of an advertising offer that conveys objective claims
about a product comprised of words and premised on theories about human metabolism or wealth creation is no different than regulating an advertisement that
contains claims about the performance of an automobile, the creation of which
is dependent upon theories about engineering and aerodynamics.
The Supreme Court has endorsed the contract/warranty theory as part of
its commercial speech jurisprudence, drawing a distinction between aspects of
246

Id. at 449.

247

Cf. id. at 454 (holding that injunction against posting the object and source code of decryption software is based solely on the software's capacity to instruct a computer to decrypt software
and that such "functional capability is not speech within the meaning of the First Amendment").
248
As one legal commentator has argued:
When commercial speech is functioning as a proposal for a commercial transaction in goods and services and has the capacity to induce that transaction,
then regulation of that speech is warranted under the government's police
power. Contract law provides remedies when an express warranty is determined to be false or misleading; likewise, when commercial speech is functioning much like an express warranty, the FTC's regulatory power is invoked
to prevent public injury from false and misleading commercial advertising.
Margaret Whelan, Note, Common Sense and Commercial Speech, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1121, 112425 (1987).
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the speech relevant to the offer and acceptance transaction and the substance of
the information communicated. 249 According to the Court, the mere fact that
words are the means of the commercial transaction does not diminish the government's interest in regulating, or power to regulate, those words.25 ° Consistently, the FTC focuses its enforcement authority on offer-like speech, targeting
publications that have "a tendency or capacity to induce the sale of ...a product.,, 25' To the extent the FTC targets objectively verifiable claims contained in
an offer to purchase a product or service and those claims reasonably can be
interpreted to be warranties about what consumers can expect from their purchase, it should not matter that the right to publish or provide the product or
service is itself fully protected by the First Amendment. Once the publisher or
provider avails himself of advertising channels to sell his wares, he relinquishes
the virtually unfettered constitutional right to make unsubstantiated claims about
the efficacy of the product or service. If he promises that following a system
will yield substantial weight loss or generate extreme wealth in order to induce
249

See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (Stevens, J., joined by

Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, J.J.) ("[Tihe State retains less regulatory authority when its commercial speech restrictions strike at 'the substance of the information communicated' rather than
the 'commercial aspect of [it]-with offerors communicating offers to offerees."') (quoting Linmark Assocs, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 701 n.28 (1977) (striking down statute that prohibited the advertisement of contraceptives); Lowe v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring, with
Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.) (noting that "offer and acceptance are communications incidental
to the regulable transaction called a contract").
250
"[l~t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course
of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by
means of language, either spoken, written, or printed. Numerous examples could be cited of
communications that are regulated without offending the First Amendment, such as the exchange
of information about securities, corporate proxy statements, the exchange of price and production
information among competitors, and employers' threats of retaliation for the labor activities of
employees. Each of these examples illustrates that the State does not lose its power to regulate
commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a component of that activity."
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,456 (1978) (internal citations omitted).
251
In re Nat'l Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89 (1976), aff'd, Nat'l Comm'n on Egg
Nutrition v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 570 F.2d 157, 163 (7th Cir. 1977) ("[A]s to the intended scope
of the Supreme Court's expressions on the subject of commercial speech, we believe they were
not intended to be narrowly limited to the mere proposal of a particular commercial transaction
but extend to false claims as to the harmlessness of the advertiser's product assertedfor the purpose of persuading members of the reading public to buy the product.") (emphasis added). See
also In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 9206, 1988 WL 490114 (Mar. 4, 1988) (reversing
dismissal of complaint challenging tobacco company's paid newspaper editorial called Of Cigarettes and Science, which did not refer to any particular brand of cigarettes but criticized the approach of some scientists to research exploring the connection between heart disease and smoking; to determine whether the editorial was commercial speech, the FTC looked to "whether the
speech is promotional in nature. Does the speech benefit or seek to benefit the economic interests
of the speaker by promoting sales of its products? And, does the speech affect or seek to affect
purchasingdecisions by the receivers of the information?")(emphasis added).
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the purchase of that system, then he will be subject to the regulatory authority of
state contract law and the FTC.
No doubt, it may be difficult to determine when the advertising claims
for a book or a system is deceptive. The easy cases involve claims like, "Buy
the book and follow its ten simple steps to be a millionaire in a month." Such a
claim promises a specific, objectively verifiable result and is made in order to
induce the purchase of the book. A more difficult case involves the "mirror
image" approach, where the advertisement claims: "Buy the book and read
about the author's simple ten-step approach to becoming a millionaire in a
month." Assuming that the book actually discusses a ten-step approach, then
the advertising claim, which refers only to the content of the book, is objectively
true, no matter how bogus the author's theory of wealth creation. Alternatively,
the FTC might interpret this advertising claim to convey the implied claim that
purchasing the book will teach the reader to quickly become a millionaire by
following ten simple steps and that there is a reasonable level of substantiation
for this claim. In that event, the mirror image approach does not foreclose an
enforcement action against the author. The author, therefore, would either have
to refrain from making unsubstantiated claims about wealth creation or at least
heavily qualify any such claims through, for example, disclaimers that explain
that the author's theories have not been substantiated by reliable evidence and/or
are based on his unique experience, and/or that the purchaser may create little or
no wealth by following the author's ten simple steps. This approach is less attractive and more cumbersome from an advertiser's perspective, but it permits
the author to make a truthful offer for his or her product.
IV. CONCLUSION

The FTC's Mirror Image Doctrine represents a significant loophole in
the agency's efforts to combat false advertising. Because the doctrine's disclosure requirements are so minimal, there is effectively no limit on an author's
ability to advertise a book touting bogus systems or regimens for achieving
dramatic benefits. This loophole significantly enhances the risk of consumer
injury, both financial and personal. The FTC should abandon the Mirror Image
Doctrine as an enforcement policy with respect to book advertising claims that
are objectively verifiable as false. Such regulation is permissible because this
type of speech is advertising pure and simple. In addition, such regulation does
not target the communicative aspect of the ideas expressed in the fully protected
book, but its functional aspect, which the advertising promises that the book, as
a product, will provide the consumer. Viewed in this manner, the FTC's regulation of false advertising for books is a permissible regulation of harmful commercial conduct, not speech.
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